

## Richard Rufus of Cornwall

### Excerpts from the *Scriptum in Metaphysicam Aristotelis 5 (Delta)*

Line numbers in the Latin edition precede each paragraph\*

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#### *SMet 5.16.E1*

[2427-2428] In particular, [Aristotle] proceeds in the following way, saying that the predicate included in the definition of the subject is said *per se* in the first mode.

[2429-2439] Subsequently he says that the accident in whose definition a proper subject is included is said *per se* in the second mode. For example, a surface is the proper subject of color, for it appears first in its definition. Hence, color is said concretely of the surface in the second mode of *per se*. However, the Commentator gives other examples of this mode. For instance, the bench is wood, and the statue is bronze, and this because wood is the proper subject of the bench and bronze of the statue. But notice that neither wood is *per se* of the bench nor bronze of the statue.<sup>1</sup> For an accident is said *per se* with respect to the subject from whose principles its principles arise, but the principles of the bench do not arise completely from the wood (since some [principle of the bench] is caused by a craftsman).

[2440-2441] Subsequently he recapitulates, saying what the first mode is and the second, and the text is clear.

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\* Unpublished critical edition of Rufus' *Scriptum in Metaphysicam Aristotelis* by Rega Wood, Neil Lewis and Jennifer Ottman (October 12, 2014). English quotations of Aristotle's texts are translations from their Latin versions listed in the bibliography. In the case of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, I use the *Arabica-Latina* which Rufus expounded. Greek texts, according to the modern editions listed in the bibliography, are included in order to facilitate comparison with their Latin translations.

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<sup>1</sup> Averroes, *In Metaph.* 5.23: "Therefore, that which is said *per se* is said in two modes. One of these, and it is the first, is that which is said according to its form, and the other according to its matter; i.e. the first subject of the form of any thing whatsoever, just as we say that the bench is wood *per se* and the statue is bronze *per se*" (ed. R. Ponzalli, p. 189; Iunt. 1552, 8: 62v; Iunt. 1562, 8: 132r-132v).

[2442-2446] Then he mentions incidentally the agreement between essence and cause, saying that the name ‘essence’ is equivalent to the name ‘cause.’ And this happens in his own language, since if someone were to ask ‘for the sake of what essence did someone do this?’ and ‘on account of what cause did someone do this?’, he would be asking the same thing.<sup>2</sup>

### *SMet 5.16.E2*

[2447-2448] Subsequently he says that the individual situated and located under a genus is said *per se* in the third mode.

[2449] Subsequently he recapitulates these three modes in order.

[2450-2454] Subsequently he posits a fourth mode, saying that what does not have any cause is said *per se* in the fourth mode. And the Commentator says: “If there is such a thing”<sup>3</sup>—as if to suggest that nothing is such except the first cause, and hence he wants to suggest that the fourth mode of *per se* is said only of the first cause.

### *SMet 5.19.Q1*

[2519-2520] Here we can ask something about the fourth mode<sup>4</sup> of *per se* posited here by Aristotle, namely, what is this mode?

[2521-2530] And it seems from his text that this fourth mode is appropriate exclusively to the first cause. For he says that the fourth mode of *per se* is what does not have a cause; but nothing seems not to have a cause except the first cause. Therefore, it is appropriate

<sup>2</sup> The two questions in Rufus’ *SMet* are: 1) “*ad quam essentiam fecit aliquis hoc*” and 2) “*ob quam causam fecit [aliquis] hoc*.” Aristotle’s text, *Metaph.* 1022a19-22, reads: “And in general ‘**that which is per se**’ and ‘**cause**’ are essentially the same, since we say ‘**for the sake of what essence** did s/he do this?’, and we say ‘**why** did s/he do this?’” // “*Et universaliter quod est per se et causa aequalia sunt in essentia; dicitur enim ad quam essentiam fecit hoc, et dicitur quare fecit hoc.*” (*Arabica-Latina*) // “ὅλως δὲ τὸ καθ’ ὃ ἰσαχῶς καὶ τὸ αἴτιον ὑπάρξει· κατὰ τί γὰρ ἐλήλυθεν ἢ οὐ ἔνεκα ἐλήλυθε λέγεται [...]” (ed. Ross). Notice that in the *Arabica-Latina* the identified terms are ‘that which is *per se*’ (*quod est per se* = τὸ καθ’ ὃ) and ‘cause’ (*causa* = τὸ αἴτιον), not ‘essence’ and ‘cause’. The equivalence between ‘essence’ and ‘cause’ comes from Averroes’ *In Metaph.* 5.23, where the questions are “*ad cuius essentiam fecit Policletus hoc*” and “*ad cuius causam fecit hoc*.”

<sup>3</sup> Averroes, *In Metaph.* 5.23: “And that which has no cause for its existence except itself (*illud quod non habet causam qua existat nisi per se*) is also said to be something that exists *per se*, if there is such a thing” (ed. R. Ponzalli, p. 191; Iunt. 1552, 8: 62v; Iunt. 1562, 8: 132v).

<sup>4</sup> The fourth mode in Aristotle’s *Metaph.* 1022a33-35: “What has no other cause, since the causes of man are many—both living and two-footed—but his *per-se* cause, in virtue of which he is a man, is man.” // “*illud quod non habet aliam causam; causae enim hominis sunt multae et vivus et bipes, sed causa eius per se secundum quod est homo est homo.*” (*Arabica-Latina*) // “οὐ μὴ ἔστιν ἄλλο αἴτιον· τοῦ γὰρ ἀνθρώπου πολλὰ αἴτια, τὸ ζῶον, τὸ δίπουν, ἀλλ’ ὅμως καθ’ αὐτὸν ἄνθρωπος ὁ ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν.” (ed. Ross).

to the first cause alone. And if this is true, the author falls short in this chapter. For he does not posit as the fourth mode of *per se* what he posited as *per se* in the *Posterior*

*Analytcs*.<sup>5</sup> For the fourth mode posited there is not subsumed under any of the three modes that he posited here first. In fact, in the *Posterior Analytcs* it is opposed to them. Also, under the fourth mode posited here it is not subsumed either, as we have already seen.

[2531-2532] And based on this we can ask what is the fourth mode posited by Aristotle in *Posterior Analytcs* I.

[2533-2537] And if someone were to say that this mode is like saying ‘what was killed died by a killing’<sup>6</sup>, he would not reply well, since he would not be saying what this mode is. But Aristotle says that the fourth mode is said *per se* of what inheres in each thing by itself (*per se dicitur de illo quod inest unicuique secundum se ipsum*).

[2538-2546] But in this regard we can ask whether the expression ‘by itself’ applies to ‘what (*quod*) [inheres]’ or to ‘each thing (*unicuique*) [in which it inheres]’.<sup>7</sup> If to ‘each thing’, then the fourth mode does not differ from the second, since the second mode is when the subject appears in the definition of the passion, and thus this mode is not distinguished from the second, since man is said to be risible according to this [mode]. But if the expression ‘by itself’ applies to ‘what’, then the fourth mode does not differ from the first, since animal inheres in man by itself, that is, insofar as he is animal.

[2547-2549] But in reply to this we must say that the fourth mode posited in *Posterior Analytcs* I and the fourth posited here are one and the same mode, and they differ in no respect from one another, and neither of them surpasses the other.

[2550-2556] And suppose that someone says: ‘Is it not possible for one mode of being *per se* to be said of God, and if so, which one is it?’ In reply to this we must say that the

<sup>5</sup> For the relevant passages, see note 6 below.

<sup>6</sup> Aristotle in *APo* 73b10-11 characterizes the fourth mode in the following way: “ἔτι δ' ἄλλον τρόπον τὸ μὲν δι' αὐτὸ ὑπάρχον ἐκάστῳ καθ' αὐτό” (ed. Ross) // “Furthermore, in another way what belongs to each thing because of itself belongs to it by itself” (trans. Barnes) // “*Item alio modo quod quidem propter ipsum inest unicuique per se*” (trans. Iac. Ven.). Rufus refers here to an example of this mode in *APo* 73b13-16: “εἰ δὲ δι' αὐτό, καθ' αὐτό, οἷον εἴ [1] τι σφαπτόμενον [2] ἀπέθανε, καὶ [3] κατὰ τὴν σφαγήν, ὅτι διὰ τὸ σφάπτεσθαι, ἀλλ' οὐ συνέβη σφαπτόμενον ἀποθανεῖν // “But if because of itself, then in itself—e.g. if [1] something slaughtered [2] died, then it died [3] by the slaughtering, since it died because of being slaughtered, and it was not accidental that it died while being slaughtered” (trans. Barnes with changes) // “*Si vero propter ipsum, per se, ut si [1] aliquod interfectum [2] interiit, [3] secundum interfectionem, quoniam propter id quod interfectum est, sed non quod accidat interfectum interire*” (trans. Iac. Ven.).

<sup>7</sup> ‘what’ translates *quod est quod* and ‘each thing’ corresponds to *quod est unicuique*. Since the fourth mode is said of “**what** inheres in **each thing** by itself” (*quod inest unicuique secundum se ipsum*), the question raised here is about the antecedent of ‘itself’ (*se ipsum*). In *APo* 73b10-11 we read: “ἔτι δ' ἄλλον τρόπον τὸ μὲν δι' αὐτὸ ὑπάρχον ἐκάστῳ καθ' αὐτό” // “*Item alio modo quod quidem propter ipsum inest unicuique per se*” (trans. Iac. Ven.) The Latin *quod inest* corresponds to τὸ ὑπάρχον, and *unicuique* to ἐκάστῳ. Thus, the question raised by Rufus is whether the antecedent of the pronoun αὐτό in καθ' αὐτό is τὸ ὑπάρχον or ἐκάστῳ.

first, the second, and the fourth are modes of the things that inhere in something else *per se*. And nothing of that sort is found in God, because God inheres in nothing and no passion inheres in Him. But if we want to extend the third mode in such a way that it belongs not only to the composite individual but to every entity that exists *per se*, then in this way it is possible to say: ‘God is *per se*’.

[2557-2571] In reply to the other [point] we must say that the fourth mode differs from the second in that predication in the fourth mode is immediate, but mediate in the second. For when a passion is predicated of a proper subject, then it is the second mode, and this predication is mediate, since a passion is demonstrated of a subject through a middle cause. But when a passion is predicated of a middle cause, and in the predicate term the form of the cause is reduplicated, the predication will be immediate, and it will be the fourth mode. And similarly the fourth mode differs from the first, since in the first the subject is not the cause of the predicate, but in the fourth mode the subject is the cause of the predicate. But this fourth mode may be when by one concrete name the subject and the cause are named, and the subject only concretely and indeterminately, but the cause in reduplication principally and determinately. For example, ‘what was killed’ (*interfectum*), when I say ‘what was killed died’ etc. (*interfectum interiit etc.*), signifies the subject concretely and indeterminately, but [it signifies] the cause principally and determinately.<sup>8</sup>

[2572-2574] But if a passion is predicated of such a concrete name, and the cause is also reduplicated in the predicate in the form of an abstraction,<sup>9</sup> [then] it will be the second mode as here: ‘What was killed died by a killing’.

[2575-2578] But in reply to the question ‘To what does the expression ‘by itself’ apply (*inest*)?’ we must say that [it applies] to ‘each thing’, and nonetheless the fourth mode is not the same as the second, since the subject is not the immediate cause of the passion.

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<sup>8</sup> Recall the example above: ‘What was killed died by a killing’ (*interfectum interiit secundum interfectionem*). The subject is *interfectum* (‘what was killed’), the predicate is *interiit* (‘died’), and the cause of the predicate is *secundum interfectionem* (‘by a killing’). According to Albert the Great in his commentary to *Posterior Analytics* 1.4, a subject term such as *interfectum* co-signifies (*consignificat*) the thing that was killed and the cause of the predicate. The latter can also be signified by means of the cognate abstract noun *interfectio* (‘a killing’). Rufus seems to have the same view here: on the one hand, the participle *interfectum* signifies the subject concretely (i.e. *this* concrete thing that was killed) and indeterminately, since *interfectum* alone does not indicate the specific sort of thing that was killed (e.g. a goat or a horse); on the other, it signifies the cause principally and determinately.

<sup>9</sup> The ‘abstraction’ (*abstractio*) clearly refers to the abstract noun *interfectio* (‘a killing’), cognate with *interficere*.